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NOTE
United States v. Stanley: Military Personnel
and the Bivens Action
In 1958 officials of the federal government secretly administered lysergic
acid diethylamide (LSD) to James B. Stanley, a sergeant in the United States
Army, pursuant to an Army study of the drug's effect on humans.' During
World War II, the United States Military Tribunal established the Nuremberg
Code as a standard by which to judge German scientists who experimented with
humans. The Nuremberg Code demanded that when human experimentation
took place,
Certain basic principles must be observed in order to satisfy moral,
ethical, and legal concepts: 1. The voluntary consent of the human
subject is absolutely essential... [The human subject should consent]
without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress,
overreaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion....
4. The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary
physical and mental suffering and injury.2
The individuals who conducted the Army LSD study failed to comply with
these standards; Stanley did not consent to the LSD testing, nor did he even
know that the drug was being administered to him. By the time he learned of
the LSD testing program seventeen years later, Stanley had endured psychologi-
cal problems, the dissolution of his marriage, and a discharge from the Army.3
In United States v. Stanley4 the United States Supreme Court held that
because Stanley's injuries arose in the course of an activity incident to his mili-
tary service, he was not entitled to a damages remedy against the federal officials
who violated his constitutional rights.5 The holding raises disturbing concerns
about the status of an individual's constitutional rights once he joins the nation's
armed services. This Note examines the evolution of constitutional claims
against federal officials, questions the wisdom of disallowing such claims when
they arise in the course of military service, and concludes that the holding in
United States v. Stanley is an unjustified bar to a serviceperson's cause of action
for the violation of his constitutional rights.
Sergeant Stanley volunteered to participate in an Army program designed
1. United States v. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. 3054, 3057 (1987).
2. United States v. Brandt (The Medical Case), 2 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nurem-'
berg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, 181-82 (1949) (quoted in part in Stan-
ley, 107 S. Ct. at 3066 (Brennan, J., dissenting)). Although the Nuremberg Code "does not have the
authority of an American statute, decisions of the United States Military Tribunal based upon it
should be considered the primary American articulation of standards governing human experimen-
tation." Note, Experimentation on Human Beings, 20 STAN. L. Rv. 99, 102-03 (1967).
3. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3057.
4. 107 S. Ct. 3054 (1987).
5. Id. at 3063.
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to test the effectiveness of equipment and protective clothing as a defense to
chemical warfare. In order to participate in this program, Stanley was released
from his duties at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and moved to the United States Army
testing grounds in Maryland. While at the testing grounds, Stanley unknow-
ingly ingested doses of LSD four times during February, 1958. As a result of the
LSD exposure, Stanley suffered psychological and emotional difficulties includ-
ing hallucinations, incoherence, impaired military performance, and memory
loss. He would awake at night and violently beat his wife and children, unable
later to remember the episode. The Army eventually discharged Stanley in
1969; one year later, his marriage dissolved as a result of his personality changes.
In December 1975 the Army sent Stanley a letter asking for his cooperation in a
further study of LSD's long-term effects on the soldiers who had participated in
the 1958 tests. The letter was the Army's first disclosure to Stanley that he had
been given the drug seventeen years earlier.6
Stanley brought an action consisting of two claims.7 His first claim was
against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for failure
to warn, monitor, or treat him after his discharge.8 In Feres v. United States 9
the Supreme Court held that servicemen could not bring a claim under the
FTCA for injuries which arise during activity incident to military service.10
Nevertheless, Stanley hoped that the government's post-discharge failure to act
would be treated as a separate tort that would be undisturbed by the Feres ex-
ception to the FTCA.11 Stanley's second claim was against unknown individual
federal officers for the violation of his constitutional rights. 12 The District Court
6. Id. at 3057.
7. Prior to taking any legal action, Stanley pursued an administrative claim for compensation
which the Army denied. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3057. His first legal action was to file suit under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) alleging negligence in the administration, supervision, and moni-
toring of the LSD testing program. Id. The district court granted the Government's motion for
summary judgment, holding that Stanley's claim was barred by Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135
(1950). Feres had established an exception to the availability of FTCA claims for injuries to service-
men "where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service." Fetes, 340
U.S. at 146.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit cleared the way for an alternative
course of action by ruling that the district court should have dismissed the FTCA claim for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction rather than disposing of the case on the merits. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at
3057. Rejecting the argument that Feres precluded both FTCA and constitutional claims, the court
of appeals held that Stanley could raise a constitutional cause of action according to Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Bivens established
that individuals could sue federal officials for money damages when those officials violate the individ-
ual's constitutional rights. See infira text accompanying notes 40-49. The court of appeals therefore
remanded Stanley's case for reconsideration of an amended complaint. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3057.
Stanley amended his complaint to state a constitutional cause of action and a renewed FTCA claim.
8. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3058.
9. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
10. Id. at 146.
11. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3058; see supra note 7.
12. Id. The source of Stanley's cause of action was his fifth amendment right to be free to
decide for himself whether to submit to drug therapy. Stanley v. United States, 574 F. Supp. 474,
476 n.1 (S.D.Fla. 1983). See also Stanley v. United States, 549 F. Supp. 327, 331 (S.D.Fla. 1982)
("This right to be free from the unwanted administration of drugs has also been associated with First
Amendment rights.").
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for the Southern District of Florida dismissed the FTCA claim, 13 but allowed
the second claim for the violation of Stanley's constitutional rights.
The district court found that because of the Supreme Court's holding in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,14 Stanley
could bring a cause of action for damages against the individual officers. 15 In
Bivens, the Supreme Court held that an individual could bring a suit for money
damages against federal officials who violated the individual's constitutional
rights. 16 Yet, in the 1983 case of Chappell v. Wallace,17 the Court prohibited
military personnel from bringing such a suit to recover damages from superior
officers who violated constitutional rights.18 Examining these two cases, the dis-
trict court interpreted Chappell to preclude a Bivens claim 19 only when a service-
man attempts to sue superior officers for constitutional violations which involve
military discipline and direct orders in the performance of military duties.20 Be-
cause Stanley's case concerned neither superior officers, military discipline, nor
direct orders, the district court allowed Stanley's constitutional cause of
action.21
After granting interlocutory review, 22 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conclusion that Chappell did not require
dismissal of Stanley's Bivens claim.23 The court of appeals also held that in light
13. Id. The district court found that any alleged negligence occurring after discharge was not
separate and distifict from the acts that occurred before Stanley's discharge. According to the dis-
trict court, there was not a separate tort, and the Feres exception applied. Id.; see supra note 7.
Contra Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344, 349 (D.D.C. 1979) (where administration of
LSD during active service resulted in injuries, the court found recovery available for post-discharge
injuries which resulted from the failure to provide plaintiff with follow-up medical treatment).
14. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
15. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3059.
16. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397. The Supreme Court recognized such suits unless there were (1)
"special factors" making it unwise to allow the action, or (2) an exclusive remedy provided by the
legislature. Id. at 396-97.
17. 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
18. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 305.
19. Courts commonly refer to a constitutional cause of action against federal officials as a Biv-
ens action or a Bivens claim. Similarly, courts refer to money damages in such an action as a Bivens
remedy. This Note will adopt the terminology.
20. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3059. In allowing Stanley's Bivens claim earlier in the litigation, the
district court cited Wallace v. Chappell, 661 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1981), as its sole authority for the
following proposition: the same military considerations giving rise to the Feres exception to the
availability of an FTCA claim do not constitute "special factors" precluding a Bivens action. Yet in
Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983), the Supreme Court reversed this authority. Nevertheless,
the district court found that Chappell did not apply to Stanley's factual setting; the court therefore
reaffirmed its decision that Stanley had a valid Bivens claim.
21. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3059.
22. The availability of interlocutory review became a contested issue in this case. When the
district court originally validated Stanley's Bivens claim, it certified its order for interlocutory appeal.
Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3058. The government argued that Stanley's failure to name individual defend-
ants resulted in the absence of an individual to seek interlocutory review of the district court's refusal
to dismiss the Bivens claim. Id. The district court granted the government's motion for partial final
judgment, giving Stanley 90 days to serve at least one individual defendant. Stanley amended his
complaint to name nine individuals and the Board of Regents of the University of Maryland rather
than unknown parties. Id.
23. Id. at 3059.
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of a recent case in the Eleventh Circuit,24 Stanley might also have had an FTCA
claim against the United States.25 The court therefore remanded the case, or-
dering the district court to allow Stanley to amend his pleadings. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 26
In a majority opinion delivered by Justice Scalia with four justices dissent-
ing, the Supreme Court found that the lower courts had interpreted Chappell too
narrowly.27 The Court restated that Bivens established the action for damages
against federal officials who violate an individual's constitutional rights. Recog-
nizing that "special factors" may preclude a Bivens claim, the Court targeted
military discipline as a possible "special factor."' 28 In Stanley the Supreme
Court attempted to determine when military discipline should act as a "special
factor" that bars a soldier's Bivens action: in narrow circumstances, precluding
a Bivens claim only when it interferes with the officer-subordinate relationship;
or in broad circumstances, precluding a claim any time military discipline is
implicated at all.
In order to resolve this issue, the Supreme Court set out a spectrum of five
possibilities.29 The Court eventually opted for a broad preclusion, disallowing a
Bivens action whenever a serviceman's injury arises out of activity "incident to
service."' 30 In choosing this alternative, the Court emphasized its earlier state-
ment in Chappell that the "special factors" that bar a Bivens claim for constitu-
tional violations are the same factors that established the Feres exception to an
FTCA claim. 3 1 In Feres the Court did not consider the officer-subordinate rela-
tionship crucial, but found instead that a serviceman could not bring an FTCA
action if his injury arose out of or in the course of an activity incident to military
service.32 This same "incident to service" test, according to the Court, should
24. Johnson v. United States, 749 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 2063 (1987). In
order to allow Stanley a potential FTCA claim, the Eleventh Circuit relied on its earlier decision in
Johnson. Yet, the Supreme Court eventually reversed the Eleventh Circuit.
25. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3059.
26. Id. The Supreme Court was especially concerned with the lower court's misinterpretation
of the holding in Chappell. Id.
27. Id. at 3060. Before discussing the primary issue, constitutional claims by servicemen, the
Supreme Court briefly disposed of a procedural issue.
The certified order from the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) was an order refusing to
dismiss Stanley's Bivens action on the basis of the Chappell decision. The petitioners appealed from
this particular order. Nevertheless, the court of appeals instructed the district court to allow Stanley
to replead his FTCA claim. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3059-60.
The Supreme Court emphasized that the Eleventh Circuit's jurisdiction was "confined to the
particular order appealed from." Id. at 3060. The Supreme Court therefore held that the court of
appeals "had no jurisdiction to enter orders relating to Stanley's long-dismissed FTCA claims." Id.
The Supreme Court vacated this portion of the judgment.
28. Id. at 3060-61.
29. The five possibilities were as follows: (1) allowing military personnel to bring Bivens claims
even against their superior officers if conduct is egregious; (2) disallowing a Bivens action whenever
an officer-subordinate relationship is at the heart of the complaint; (3) disallowing Bivens actions not
only in officer-subordinate situations, but whenever military discipline is affected; (4) disallowing
Bivens actions whenever the injury arises out of activity "incident to service"; and (5) disallowing
Bivens claims by servicemen entirely. Id. at 3062.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950); see infra text accompanying notes 95-104.
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determine whether a serviceman can bring a Bivens action against the federal
officials who violate his constitutional rights.
33
In deciding to tolerate very little impairment of military discipline, the
Supreme Court expressed two primary concerns. First, the Court discussed the
relationship between the courts and the nation's military structure. The major-
ity recognized that it was the legislature's role to regulate the military; the Court
wanted to prevent the judiciary from becoming involved in a "congressionally
uninvited" area.34 Seeking to minimize this judicial intrusion into military mat-
ters, the Supreme Court found that the Feres principles were superior. Accord-
ing to the Court, a broad exception to the Bivens action based on the "incident to
service" test would prevent the courts from becoming overly involved in the
military.35 Second, the Court was concerned that allowing servicemen to sue
federal officials would disrupt the nation's military affairs. According to the
Court, a detailed analysis of whether each particular case involved military dis-
cipline would require too much intrusion into military matters. Because deposi-
tions and trial testimony often would be necessary, "the mere process of arriving
at correct conclusions would disrupt the military regime."3 6 The "incident to
service" test, on the other hand, could be satisfied with much less inquiry into
military affairs. Thus, the Court concluded that any time an injury arises in the
course of an activity incident to military service, military discipline poses as a
"special factor" which precludes servicemen from bringing an action for dam-
ages against federal officials who violate constitutional rights.
37
The Supreme Court looked to the Feres principles to determine when the
courts should dismiss a Bivens claim. The Court rejected the idea that a Bivens
action should be afforded military personnel unless the officer-subordinate rela-
tionship was in jeopardy. The Court instead held that since Feres prevented an
action by servicemen under the FTCA whenever the injury arose during an ac-
tivity "incident to service," a damages action for the violation of constitutional
rights should also be barred whenever the injury occured during an activity
which was "incident to service." The Court reasoned that since the same con-
cerns-discipline, judicial restraint, and military disruption-underlay the issues
in both Feres and Stanley, a single principle should control in both cases. When
a serviceman brings an action for damages against the federal officials who vio-
late the serviceman's constitutional rights,
the "special factors counselling hesitation".., extend beyond the situ-
ation in which an officer-subordinate relationship exists, and require
abstention in the inferring of Bivens actions as extensive as the excep-
tion to the FTCA established by Feres and United States v. Johnson
... no Bivens remedy is available for injuries that "arise out of or are in
33. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3062.
34. Id. at 3062-63. Under the United States Constitution, "The Congress shall have Power...
to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, ci. 14.
35. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3062-63.
36. Id. at 3063.
37. Id.
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the course of activity incident to service."'38
Because the court of appeals failed to dismiss Stanley's Bivens claim even though
his injuries arose out of an activity incident to military service, the United States
Supreme Court reversed this portion of the holding. 39 Stanley was without a
cause of action.
In order to understand the Court's holding in United States v. Stanley, it is
necessary to explore the origin and evolution of the action for damages against,
federal officials who violate constitutional rights. In the 1971 case of Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Aqents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,4° the United States
Supreme Court decided that an individual could recover money damages from a
federal official who violated the individual's constitutional rights.4 1 The peti-
tioner in Bivens sought 15,000 dollars from various agents of the Federal Bureau
of Narcotics as compensation for suffering which resulted when the agents con-
ducted a search and seizure in violation of the fourth amendment.4 2 The re-
spondents, on the other hand, argued that rights of privacy are creations of state
law and that petitioner should be allowed to collect money damages only by an
action in tort under state law. 43
The Supreme Court disagreed with the respondents' limited view of consti-
tutional rights. The Court stressed the principle that the fourth amendment was
"an independent limitation upon the exercise of federal power." 44 The Court
concluded that when "petitioner's complaint states a cause of action under the
Fourth Amendment,... petitioner is entitled to recover money damages for any
injuries he has suffered as a result of the agents' violation of the Amendment.1 45
Bivens stands for the principle that a violation of a constitutional right by federal
officials gives rise to an action for money damages against those officials. 46
38. Id. (quoting Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304 and Feres, 340 U.S. at 146, respectively).
39. Id. at 3065.
40. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
41. Id. In the 1946 case of Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), the plaintiffs brought an action to
recover more than $3,000 in damages from FBI agents for injuries arising from the violation of their
fourth and fifth amendment rights. They alleged that the agents imprisoned them and subjected
their premises to an unlawful search. Id. at 679. The Supreme Court ruled on several issues. It
sustained federal subject matter jurisdiction for the purpose of adjudicating suits brought to recover
damages for the deprivation of a citizen's constitutional rights. Id. at 684-85. The Court found it to
be "established practice for this Court to sustain the jurisdiction of federal courts to issue injunctions
to protect rights safeguarded by the Constitution." Id. (emphasis added). The Court even indicated
that "where federally protected rights have been invaded .... courts will be alert to adjust their
remedies so as to grant the necessary relief." Id. Yet, despite these various hints and indications, the
Supreme Court never ruled directly on the availability of money damages for the violation of consti-
tutional rights. The Bell opinion even acknowledged that the "question [had] never been specifically
decided by this Court." Id. at 684. Because Bell did nothing to provide a decisive resolution, the
Bivens Court confronted the issue in 1971.
42. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389-90.
43. Id. at 390.
44. Id. at 394. The Court rejected the theory that the fourth amendment acts only as a limita-
tion upon a federal officer's defense to a state law claim. Id.
45. Id. at 397. In authorizing money damages, the Court reasoned that "[h]istorically, dam-
ages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty." Id.
at 395. The Court also cited the language from Bell that "federal courts may use any available
remedy to make good the wrong done." Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) (citation omitted).
46. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397; see also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980) ("Bivens estab.
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The Supreme Court's language in Bivens implied two possible situations in
which a suit for money damages against a federal officer would be inappropriate.
First, the Court found "no special factors counselling hesitation in the absence
of affirmative action by Congress." 47 Second, the Court found "no explicit con-
gressional declaration that persons injured by a federal officer's violation ...
may not recover money damages from the agents, but must instead be remitted
to another remedy."'48 Thus, even though the general rule Was that a victim
may recover money damages from federal officials who violate the individual's
constitutional rights, the Court recognized two exceptions. First, a court may
refuse to allow an action when there are "special factors counselling hesita-
tion."'49 Second, a Bivens action is unavailable when Congress has provided an
exclusive and equally effective remedy.
The Bivens Court declined to consider whether the respondents were im-
mune from liability because of their official positions.50 The Court's opinion
seven years later in Butz v. Economou 5 1 thus served as a generalization of the
Bivens holding and as a comment on immunity. The complaint in Butz
presented many causes of action, several stating claims for damages under the
United States Constitution. The defendants, officials from the Department of
Agriculture, claimed official immunity.5 2 First, the Court stated that
the decision in Bivens established that a citizen suffering a compensable
injury to a constitutionally protected interest could invoke the general
federal-question jurisdiction of the district courts to obtain an award of
monetary damages against the responsible federal official.
5 3
As for immunity, the Court found that the cause of action granted in Bivens
would be worthless if federal officials received absolute immunity from liability
for their unconstitutional conduct.5 4 The Court held that any federal official
seeking exemption from personal liability would have to prove that "public pol-
icy requires an exemption." 5 5
In 1979 the Supreme Court's opinion in Davis v. Passman 56 provided a
further refinement and application of the principles established in Bivens. Davis
brought an action against Congressman Otto E. Passman for sexual discrimina-
tion in violation of the due process clause of the fifth amendment; she sought
lished that the victims of a constitutional violation by a federal agent have a right to recover damages
against the official in federal court despite the absence of any statute coriferring such a right.").
47. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396.
48. Id. at 397.
49. Id. at 396.
50. Id. at 397-98.
51. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
52. Id. at 483.
53. Id. at 504.
54. Id. at 505.
55. Id. at 506. For a more thorough discussion of immunity principles, see infra text adcompa-
nying notes 144-155. For purposes of the historical development of the damages remedy against
federal officials, Butz stands for the idea that the Bivens remedy will not be turned into a myth by
granting federal officials absolute immunity. Id. at 505.
56. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
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money damages in the form of back pay.5 7 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit held that Davis could not infer a cause of action from the
fifth amendment.5 8 Reversing the circuit court, the Supreme Court refined the
Bivens doctrine by holding that individuals could bring an action directly under
the Constitution. Unlike situations involving statutory rights, victims do not
need a congressional mandate in order to bring an action under the
Constitution.5 9
In Davis v. Passman the Court also applied the Bivens analysis to determine
whether an exception should be found to the usual availability of a damages
remedy for constitutional violations. First, the Court recognized that special
factors may counsel hesitation in granting a Bivens claim against a United States
congressman. Yet the concerns were not strong enough to warrant an excep-
tion; any protection from a damages action would be found in the speech or
debate clause of the Constitution rather than in the judicial disallowance of a
Bivens remedy.6° Second, the Court found no congressional declaration that
persons in Davis' position should be unable to recover money damages for inju-
ries resulting from unconstitutional conduct.6 1 Because neither the "special fac-
tors" exception nor the "legislative remedy" exception applied, the Supreme
Court held that Davis could bring a money damages action for injuries resulting
when Passman violated her fifth amendment rights.62
Carlson v. Green,63 decided in 1980, was an important step in the develop-
ment of the Bivens action. Joseph Jones, a federal prison inmate, died as a result
of injuries sustained when federal prison officials, allegedly due to racial preju-
dice, provided inadequate medical attention. Jones' mother brought an action
for compensatory and punitive damages for the violation of his due process,
equal protection, and eighth amendment rights.64 The issue in Carlson was
whether an individual could assert a Bivens claim directly under the Constitu-
57. Id. at 231. Passman fired Davis, a deputy administrative assistant, because Passman felt it
was essential that a man fill the position.
58. Id. at 232.
59. Id. at 241-42. The Court reached this conclusion by discussing the difference between stat-
utory and constitutional rights. Because statutory rights are established by the legislature, Congress
can dictate which parties may enforce the rights. Constitutional rights, on the other hand, are more
fundamental, and the courts must act as the special guardians of these rights. Rather than insisting
on a congressional mandate, the Court stated that "litigants who allege that their own constitutional
rights have been violated ... must be able to invoke the existing jurisdiction of the courts for the
protection of their justiciable constitutional rights." Id. at 242. Davis was therefore held to be an
appropriate party with a cause of action under the fifth amendment. Id. at 244.
The Court also emphasized that the money damages remedy is appropriate. First, damages
have been viewed as the traditional remedy for the violation of personal liberty. Second, since Pass-
man was no longer a Congressman and Davis could not be reinstated, Davis had no alternative form
of relief. Id. at 245.
60. Id. at 246.
61. Id. at 247. Section 717 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16
(1964), does not include congressional employees such as Davis. The Court decided, however, that
§ 717 was not meant to foreclose other possible remedies. Davis, 442 U.S. at 247. The Court refused
to deny Davis a Bivens remedy simply because § 717 fails to protect congressional employees. Id. at
247.
62. Id. at 248.
63. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
64. Id. at 16.
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tion when his allegations would also support a claim under the FTCA. 65 After
applying the Bivens analysis and affirming a constitutional cause of action, 66 the
Court found nothing in the FTCA to suggest that Congress meant to preclude a
Bivens remedy or to make the FTCA exclusive.67 Carlson, like Davis v. Pass-
man, provided an additional example of the Supreme Court holding that victims
of unconstitutional conduct could sue federal officials for money damages. The
Court also recognized the two exceptions to the Bivens rule but concluded that
neither was applicable.
The Carlson opinion also contrasted actions based on the FTCA with ac-
tions following the Bivens rationale. The Federal Tort Claims Act grants indi-
viduals an action in tort against the federal government, stating that "[tihe
United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort
claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances." '68 Bivens provided a money damages remedy for injuries
which result when federal officials violate an individual's constitutional rights.69
In determining that the respondent wag not limited to an FTCA claim, the Carl-
son Court drew four distinctions between a Bivens claim and an FTCA claim.
First, the Bivens remedy has a greater deterrent effect because the Bivens remedy
is recoverable against individuals, whereas the FTCA remedy is assessed against
the United States government. 70 Second, a court may award punitive damages
in a Bivens action, whereas they are statutorily prohibited under the FTCA. 71
Third, a plaintiff can opt for a jury trial in a Bivens action, but such a choice is
unavailable under the FTCA.72 Fourth, an action under the FTCA is available
only if the state in which the misconduct occurred would also permit a cause of
action for the same misconduct. An action for the violation of constitutional
rights, on the other hand, is available regardless of provisions of state law. 73
The Court suggested that these four differences prove that the "FTCA is not a
sufficient protector of the citizens' constitutional rights," 74 and "the Bivens rem-
edy is more effective than the FTCA remedy." 75
In 1983, in contrast to cases such as Davis and Carlson in which the Bivens
65. Id. at 16-17.
66. Id. at 19. In establishing the existence of a constitutional claim, the Supreme Court re-
stated the Bivens rule and its two exceptions. Applying the analysis, the Court found "no special
factors counselling hesitation," reasoning that prison officials do not have "such independent status
... [so] as to suggest that judicially created remedies against them might be inappropriate." Id.
67. Id. at 19-20.
68. Federal Tort Claims Act § 410(a), 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982).
69. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.
70. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 21.
71. Id. at 21-22. The Court acknowledged that its decisions had not expressly provided for
punitive damages in a Bivens action, but the Court reasoned that established cases and principles
indicate that punitive damages are available. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 23. For a discussion of the relationship between these four distinctions and the Stan-
ley decision, see infra text accompanying notes 139-43.
74. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 23.
75. Id. at 20. But see Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983). In Bush the Supreme Court did not
allow a civil service employee to bring a Bivens action against federal employers who violated his first
amendment rights. The Court decided that because Congress had provided civil servants with coin-
1988]
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remedy was sustained, the Supreme Court held that military personnel could not
bring suit to recover damages from superior officers for alleged constitutional
violations.76 Chappell v. Wallace,77 a case in which "special factors" actually
precluded a Bivens action, became the primary authority drawn upon by the
Court in Stanley.
78
Unlike its analysis in the earlier cases, the Court in Chappell based its hold-
ing on the principle that a court must consider "special factors counselling hesi-
tation" before it can make a Bivens remedy available.79 Furthermore, the Court
discovered "special factors" which made it "inappropriate to provide enlisted
military personnel a Bivens-type remedy against their superior officers."' 80 The
first "special factor" was a concern for military discipline.8 1 The Court wanted
to avoid any disruption of the soldier-superior relationship which would result if
soldiers could bring their superior officers into court on charges of unconstitu-
tional conduct.8 2 The second "special factor" was Congress' repeated activity in
the field of military justice.8 3 The Court believed that Congress had established
prehensive remedies, thejudiciary should not supplement this system with a judicially created rem-
edy. Bush, 462 U.S. at 388-90.
The relationship between statutory remedies and the Bivens action has raised interesting issues.
Originally, the "special factors" exception to the Bivens action was separate from the "exclusive
legislative remedy" exception. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396-97. In Bush Congress had not provided an
equally effective substitute for the Bivens action. The "exclusive legislative remedy" exception did
not apply. Bush, 462 U.S. at 378.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court disallowed the cause of action under the "special factors"
exception; the elaborate statutory procedures protecting civil servants and the extensive legislative
activity in the field constituted "special factors" which precluded the Bivens action. Thus, the Court
merged the two exceptions. Bush raises an important question: how extensive, meaningful, and
effective must a statutory scheme be before it becomes a "special factor" which bars a Bivens action.
For a complete discussion of this issue, see Note, Bivens Doctrine in Flux: Statutory Preclusion ofa
Constitutional Cause of Action, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1251 (1988).
In Stanley the merging of the two exceptions and statutory preclusion are not paramount issues.
The Stanley Court specifically stated "The 'special [factor]' that 'counsel[s] hesitation' is not the fact
that Congress has chosen to afford some manner of relief in the particular case, but the fact that
congressionally uninvited intrusion into military affairs by the judiciary is inappropriate." Stanley,
107 S. Ct. at 3063.
76. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305 (1983).
77. Id.
78. The respondents in Chappell, five enlisted men in the United States Navy, brought an action
against several Navy officers seeking damages for injuries resulting from constitutional violations.
The men alleged that their superior officers threatened them, gave them undesirable duties, gave
them low performance evaluations, and imposed severe penalties upon them because of their minor-
ity race. Id. at 297. The Supreme Court granted certiorari for the specific purpose of determining
whether military personnel could bring a Bivens action against their superior officers for injuries
sustained during military service as a result of constitutional violations. Id.
79. This step in the analysis is now mandatory. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 298 ("a court must take
into account any 'special factors counselling hesitation' "); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1982)
(decided the same day as Chappell, the Court held that federal courts must "[pay] particular heed
... to any special factors counselling hesitation before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation");
see also Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3061 (discussing the "special factors" limitation to a Bivens claim and
stating that in Chappell and Bush, "dictum became holding").
80. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304.
81. Id. at 300.
82. Id. at 300-02.
83. Id. at 302 ("Congress has exercised its plenary constitutional authority over the military ...
taking into account the special patterns that define the military structure."). By finding that Con-
gress' activity in the field constituted a "special factor," the Court again merged the two traditional
exceptions to the Bivens action. See supra note 75.
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a comprehensive system of military justice, a system which did not include a
damages remedy against superior officers for the violation of constitutional
rights.84 The Supreme Court concluded that because "the unique disciplinary
structure of the Military Establishment and Congress' activity in the field consti-
tute 'special factors' . . . enlisted military personnel may not maintain a suit to
recover damages from a superior officer for alleged constitutional violations."8 -5
According to the Court in Chappell, the "special factors" which precluded
a serviceman's Bivens claim also formed the basis of the decision in Feres v.
United States,86 in which the Supreme Court prohibited a serviceman from suing
the United States under the FTCA. 87 Feres established a broad disallowance of
FTCA claims by military personnel,8 8 and the Chappell Court sought to use a
similar analysis to bar a constitutional claim. The language in the Chappell
opinion, however, suggested that respect for officer-subordinate discipline was
the true reason for dismissing the Bivens action.89 The holding in Chappell was
couched in language such as "[tihe inescapable demands of military discipline
and obedience to orders . . ";9 "unhesitating and decisive action by officers
and equally disciplined responses by enlisted personnel . .,,;91 and "special
relationship of the soldier to his superiors."'92 It was therefore uncertain
whether Chappell established a broad or a narrow exception to the Bivens action.
The Supreme Court settled any confusion in United States v. Stanley.
93
When a serviceman brings a Bivens action, the "special factors" which bar his
claim exist not only in the officer-subordinate relationship, but in any situation
in which the injury arises out of or in the course of activity incident to service.94
According to the Stanley Court, these "special factors" that prohibit a service-
man's constitutional cause of action are defined by the exception to FTCA
claims established in Feres v. United States.95 Thus, in order to understand
when a court will dismiss a serviceman's Bivens claim, it is necessary to briefly
review the cases which established the exception to FTCA claims.
In Feres v. United States,96 decided in 1950, the issue was whether service-
men could bring an action against the United States under the FTCA for injuries
84. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304.
85. Id. at 304-05.
86. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
87. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 298-99.
88. Feres, 340 U.S. at 146.
89. Based on the language in Chappell, the district court and the court of appeals in Stanley
concluded that Bivens actions should be precluded only when a serviceman brings suit against a
superior officer for wrongs stemming from direct orders in situations requiring the discipline neces-
sary to perform military duties. See Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3059. Finding such factors absent in
Stanley's situation, the lower courts allowed his Bivens claim. Id.
90. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300.
91. Id. at 304.
92. Id. (quoting Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 676 (1977) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1979))).
93. 107 S. Ct. 3054 (1987).
94. Id. at 3063.
95. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3063.
96. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
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sustained while on active duty and attributable to the negligence of other mili-
tary personnel. 97 Feres concluded with language which greatly influenced the
Stanley Court thirty-seven years later: "the Government is not liable under the
Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out
of or are in the course of activity incident to service."9 8 Later cases, however,
indicated that this exception to FTCA actions by military personnel was not as
broad and encompassing as the Feres language suggested. Later opinions im-
plied that discipline, response to orders, and officer-subordinate relations were
the true foundations for the Feres exception to the FTCA.99
In United States v. Johnson,100 decided just five weeks before Stanley, the
Supreme Court clarified the "activity incident to service" test and re-established
this language as a broad disallowance of FTCA claims. Lieutenant Commander
Johnson, a Coast Guard helicopter pilot, was killed as a result of negligent radar
assistance by an employee of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). 10'
Because the FAA employee was a civilian, the case did not involve discipline or
obedience to orders. Nevertheless, the Court declared that Feres prevented a
serviceman's FTCA action whenever his injuries were service-related; the Court
refused to modify this doctrine due to the civilian status of the tortfeasor.
10 2
97. Id. at 138. The case was actually a consolidation of three factual settings: the Feres case,
where plaintiff died in a barracks fire, id. at 136-37; the Jefferson case, where an Army surgeon
negligently left a surgical towel in the plaintiff's abdomen, id. at 137; and the Griggs case, where the
plaintiff died due to unskilled medical treatment, id.
98. Id. at 146. According to the Court in Feres, Congress did not design the FTCA to create
unprecedented causes of action, but instead authorized "acceptance of liability under circumstances
that would bring private liability into existence." Id. at 141. Since no law had ever allowed a service-
man to recover for negligence against either his superior officers or the federal government, no such
cause of action was recognized under the FrCA. Id. The Court also was persuaded by two addi-
tional concerns: first, that Congress had already provided "systems of simple, certain, and uniform
compensation for injuries or death of those in armed services," and second, that local tort law should
not govern the "distinctly federal" relationship between the government and enlisted personnel. Id.
at 143-44.
Later cases commonly list three rationales as the foundation of the Feres exception: (1) the
distinctively federal relationship between government and military personnel; (2) the availability of
alternative compensation systems; and (3) the potential damage to military discipline. Atkinson v.
United States, 825 F.2d 202, 204 (9th Cir. 1987).
99. For example, in United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954), the Supreme Court deter-
mined that injuries to a former serviceman sustained in a veterans hospital did not arise during an
activity incident to service. Id. at 113. The Court commented that Feres precluded FTCA claims by
military personnel because of
[t]he peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the effect of the main-
tenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme results that might obtain if suits under
the Tort Claims Act were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in
the course of military duty....
IAL at 112. See also United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (quoting Brown and disallowing
FTCA claim when the action would come at the expense of military discipline and effectiveness);
Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1976) (in shielding government from
indemnity action, Court especially wanted to avoid trials which would involve second-guessing mili-
tary orders or require servicemen to testify as to each other's decisions and actions); United States v.
Munz, 347 U.S. 150, 162 (1962) (Court quoting the language from Brown and prefacing it as best
explanation of Feres); United States v. Carroll, 369 F.2d 618, 621 (8th Cir. 1966) ("crucial question"
which determines liability under the FTCA was whether soldier-superior relationship was in effect at
time of accident).
100. 107 S. Ct. 2063 (1987).
101. Id. at 2063.
102. Id. at 2066-67.
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Military discipline was still the factor which precluded an action, but the
Supreme Court now defined the concept in broader terms:
[M]ilitary discipline involves not only obedience to orders, but more
generally duty and loyalty to one's service and to one's country. Suits
brought by service members against the Government for service-re-
lated injuries could undermine the commitment essential to effective
service and thus have the potential to disrupt military discipline in the
broadest sense of the word.103
As a result of this broader definition, Johnson's widow could not bring an FTCA
suit.'1 4
According to the Court in Johnson, the injuries that "arise out of or are in
the course of activity incident to service" are equivalent to any service-related
injuries which could potentially implicate loyalty and commitment to the mili-
tary.10 - Clearly, broadening the Feres exception expands the number of pre-
cluded FTCA actions by servicemen. The Supreme Court's next comment on
causes of action by military personnel came just five weeks later in United States
v. Stanley. In Stanley the Court declared that the Feres/Johnson principles
should also apply to the Bivens claim: whenever injuries are in any way service
related, "special factors preclude a Bivens Action by military personnel in order
to protect a broad concept of discipline and loyalty." 10 6
In Bivens the Supreme Court enabled a citizen to bring a suit for money
damages against any federal official who violated the individual's constitutional
rights.10 7 In Chappell the Court found that two "special factors"-the discipli-
nary structure of the military and Congress' provisions for military justice-
make it especially unwise to allow servicemen to bring constitutional claims
against their superior officers.108 In Stanley the Court held that this concern for
discipline that precludes a serviceman's claim exists not only in the officer-
subordinate setting, but in any situation in which injuries arise out of activity
incident to military service.10 9 The drug experimentation performed on Sergeant
Stanley raises serious questions about whether the Supreme Court properly ex-
103. Id. at 2069.
104. Id. In Major v. United States, 835 F.2d 641 (6th Cir. 1987), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed four recent Supreme Court decisions including United States
v. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. 3054 (1987); United States v. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. 2063 (1987); United States v.
Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985); and Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983). The court of appeals
concluded that as a result of these four cases, the Feres exception now encompasses,
all injuries suffered by military personnel that are even remotely related to the individual's
status as a member of the military, without regard to the location of the event, the status
(military or civilian) of the tortfeasor, or any nexus between the injury-producing event and
the essential defense/combat purpose of the military activity from which it arose.
Major, 835 F.2d at 644-45 (6th Cir. 1987).
105. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 2069.
106. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3063. The Supreme Court intended that both FTCA actions and
Bivens actions be precluded when the injury is service related. The Court saw no reason why "judg-
ment in the Bivens context should be any less protective of military concerns than it has been with
respect to FTCA suits ..... Id. at 3062.
107. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.
108. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304-05.
109. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3063.
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tended this "special factors" exception. The remainder of this Note will analyze
the logic and fairness of the holding. The discussion will focus on three primary
issues: first, whether the Stanley decision was a proper development of Feres
and Bivens principles; second, whether the holding is consistent with the law of
immunity; and third, whether the decision results in sound policy and humane
treatment of military personnel.
In a sense, the Stanley decision was clearly in line with precedent. Chappell
v. Wallace held that special factors made it "inappropriate to provide enlisted
military personnel a Bivens-type remedy against their superior officers."
110
Although defendants in Chappell were definitely the serviceman's superior of-
ficers, the Supreme Court specifically stated that the Feres analysis guided the
decision.111 The Chappell Court at least mentioned that it did not intend to
place great weight on the officer-subordinate relationship. Instead, the Court
aimed for a broad exception to a serviceman's Bivens claim by refering to Feres,
a case which established an exception to the FTCA whenever an injury occurred
during activity "incident to service." 112 The Stanley Court merely elaborated
the language first introduced in Chappell, emphasizing that the "incident to ser-
vice" test governs whenever a serviceman attempts to bring a Bivens action. 113
The Stanley decision also enjoyed the support of United States v. Johnson.
In Johnson the Court enlarged the notion of military discipline from obeying
orders to a general loyalty to the military.114 This enlargement resulted in a
broader prohibition of FTCA claims and therefore a broader bar to a Bivens
action. With Chappell holding that concerns over military discipline preclude a
110. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304.
111. Id. at 299.
112. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3062-63. Prior to Stanley, jurisdictions appeared to be split on how
seriously discipline and direct orders had to be threatened before the Bivens action would be pre-
cluded. Several jurisdictions strictly protected military autonomy with little concern for the degree
of discipline involved. See, eg., Jorden v. National Guard Bureau, 799 F.2d 99, 107 (3d Cir. 1986)
("The clear implication of Chappell [was] that while some non-damage constitutional claims involv-
ing the military remain viable, damage claims do not."); Mollnow v. Carlton, 716 F.2d 627, 630 (9th
Cir. 1983) ("the Court [in Chappell] necessarily imposed aperse prohibition on the filing of Bivens-
type actions by servicemen against their superiors."). Other jurisdictions weighed the rights of ser-
vicemen against the level of discipline involved. See, e.g., Shaw v. Gwatney, 584 F. Supp. 1357, 1362
(E.D.Ark. 1984) (once a serviceman alleges a constitutional violation, suitability for judicial review
depends on balance between plaintiff's right and degree of interference with military affairs); Stanley
v. United States, 574 F. Supp. 474, 479 (S.D.Fla. 1983) (Chappell only precludes Bivens action "for
wrongs which involve direct orders in the performance of military duty and the discipline and order
necessary thereto.").
113. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3062-63; see Gaspard v. United States, 713 F.2d 1097, 1103 (5th Cir.
1983) (when former serviceman brought a Bivens action against federal officers for injuries resulting
from exposure to radiation during testing of nuclear weapons, the court dismissed his cause of ac-
tion, finding that "the rationale behind the Feres doctrine bars the Bivens claims"); Schnurman v.
United States, 490 F. Supp. 429, 438 (E.D. Va. 1980) (where plaintiff's injuries resulted from a
mustard gas experiment conducted while he was in the Navy, the court found Feres principles pre-
cluded his constitutional cause of action); Nagy v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 383, 384 (D.D.C.
1979) (in a case also involving LSD experimentation, the court found that "[a]n action sounding in
constitutional, as opposed to common law, tort is not exempt for application of the Feres doctrine");
Misko v. United States, 453 F. Supp. 513, 516 (D.D.C. 1978) (plaintiff, seeking money damages,
alleged that administration of drugs against his will violated his fifth amendment rights to liberty and
due process of law; court held that "Feres and principles of intra-military immunity bar the particu-
lar constitutional claim").
114. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 2069.
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serviceman's Bivens claim 1 5 and Johnson expanding the definition of military
discipline,116 the decision in Stanley was a very reasonable addition to Bivens
principles.
Despite the value of Chappell and Johnson as precedent for Stanley, how-
ever, the factual differences between Chappell and Stanley cannot be ignored
when analyzing the concept of military discipline. In Chappell the soldiers
brought suits against superior officers well known to them. 117 In Stanley the
relationship between Sergeant Stanley and the individuals who administered the
LSD was unknown. 118 Because Stanley did not report routinely to these officials
and was not aware of the testing, the military discipline factor was arguably
absent in Stanley. Although the Supreme Court recognized this distinction, the
Court cited a broader concern for military discipline and decided that constitu-
tional claims should be prohibited whenever the Bivens action could generally
affect loyalty to the military.119
Yet, the Supreme Court heightened its concern over military discipline
without adequate justification. The Chappell decision at least protected the day-
to-day ability of superior officers to command their troops. The decision enabled
officers to issue orders without the fear that enlisted personnel would bring con-
stitutional claims against them. 120 The Court's goal was clear and specific. The
Stanley decision, however, protected a general concept of discipline rather than
specific officers.12 1 Protecting military discipline is very important when the im-
mediate superior-subordinate relationship is at stake. On the other hand, pro-
tecting an abstract notion of discipline and loyalty has very little practical
impact. A decision with such sparse practical effect should not justify the denial
of a soldier's constitutional rights. The Court appeared to protect discipline for
discipline's sake.'12 The Court's additional concern, a desire to limit intrusion
into military affairs by the judiciary,123 provided more justification than the illu-
115. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304.
116. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 2069.
117. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 297.
118. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3058.
119. Id. at 3063. See also United States v. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. 2063, 2069 (1987) ("military
discipline involves not only obedience to orders, but more generally duty and loyalty to one's service
and to one's country.").
120. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304.
121. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3062.
122. In discussing the circumstances under which aBivens claim should be precluded, the Court
proposed five possibilities. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3062; see supra note 29. The third possibility was to
disallow the Bivens claim "when it affirmatively appears that military discipline would be affected."
Id. The fourth possibility, which became the Court's holding, was to disallow the Bivens action
"whenever the injury arises out of activity 'incident to service.'" By choosing the fourth alternative
instead of the third, the Court displayed concern for an overly vague notion of discipline that appar-
ently goes beyond the normal usage of the term. Id.
See also Schwartz, Making Intramilitary Tort Law More Civil A Proposed Reform of the Feres
Doctrine, 95 YALE L.J. 992 (1986). Schwartz argued that "the military's interest in such strict
discipline cannot be the value of discipline for its own sake, or even for the sake of performing the
military's wide range of non-combat functions; its interest ultimately lies in the connection between
discipline and combat readiness and effectiveness." Schwartz then maintained that combat effective-
ness is not correlated with blind obedience to commands. Id. at 1007 (footnote omitted). Though
Schwartz was discussing Feres, his comments about discipline apply to Stanley as well.
123. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3063. The Stanley Court wanted to minimize judicial intrusion into
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sory goal of protecting an abstract idea of military discipline. Yet, in a properly
maintained military structure, violations of a soldier's constitutional rights
should be very rare. Thus, judicial intrusion into military affairs would seldom
occur. The Court therefore allowed the possibility of occasional intrusions into
military affairs to outweigh the protection of rights guaranteed by the
Constitution. 124
It is also questionable whether the Court in Stanley should have based an
exception to a constitutional cause of action on the Feres exception to the
FTCA. Perhaps the Court should subject the intentional violation of fundamen-
tal constitutional rights to greater scrutiny than negligent acts.125 Perhaps con-
stitutional torts should be judged differently than negligent torts. Justice
Brennan apparently agreed with this idea by devoting a portion of his dissent to
an analysis of whether the Feres rationales should apply to the Bivens claim.1 26
Justice Brennan repeated the three rationales underlying the Feres excep-
tion to the availability of FTCA claims:' 27 (1) various state tort laws should not
govern the "distinctly federal" soldier-government relationship;128 (2) an effi-
cient system of justice and compensation is already in place within the mili-
tary;129 and (3) recognition of a soldier's FTCA claim would impair military
discipline.' 30 The first Feres rationale did not apply to a Bivens action because
uniform federal law would govern the Bivens action. 13 1 The second rationale did
not apply to a Bivens action because the Veteran Benefits Act does not address
constitutional violations unless the resulting injury can be defined as "disa-
bling." 1 32 Only the third rationale, a concern for military discipline, could rea-
sonably apply to both FTCA and Bivens actions.' 3 3 According to Brennan,
however, no component of military discipline contemplated in Feres existed in
Stanley.'34 First, obedience to orders was not implicated because Stanley was
unaware of the experiment, and civilians may have overseen the LSD testing
military matters, because the Constitution gives Congress, not the judiciary, the authority to regulate
the military. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35. Yet, the Court failed to reconcile this goal
with the principle that "justiciable constitutional rights are to be enforced through the courts." Da-
vis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 242 (1979).
124. See Schwartz, 95 YALE L. J. at 1004, where the author stated, "there is a recognized public
interest in having a military establishment that is not entirely closed, monolithic, and secretive."
Schwartz also suggested that allowing a Bivens remedy would not result in an explosion of litigation.
Id. at 1005. He hypothesized that "because a Bivens action must allege the tortious violation of a
constitutional right, the Bivens action might screen out claims less deserving of the level of deterence
generated by damage awards in federal court." Id. at 1015 (footnote omitted).
125. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3074 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "Bivens involves not negligent acts,
but intentional constitutional violations that m~ust be deterred and punished." Id.
126. Id. at 3074-76.
127. Id. at 3074-76; see supra note 98.
128. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3074 n.23 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
129. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 3074 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 3074 n.23 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
132. Id. See Veterans Benefits Act, 38 U.S.C. §§ 301-362 (1982); Donaldson, Constitutional
Torts and Military Effectiveness: A Proposed Alternative to the Feres Doctrine, 23 A.F. L. REV. 171,
197-99 (1982-83).
133. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3074 (Brennan, 3., dissenting).
134. Id. at 3074-76 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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program.1 35 Second, judicial intrusion into military matters was not a valid con-
cern because today, the judiciary is generally involved in military matters in
connection with several types of action.1 36 Third, the "vigor of military deci-
sionmaking" component of Feres was less applicable to a Bivens action than to
an FTCA claim, because officers should have a duty to consider whether their
actions comply with the Constitution.137 Brennan concluded that because Feres
rationales do not apply to a Bivens action by servicemen, Feres should not con-
trol such an action. 138
Finally, the 1980 case of Carlson v. Green 139 reveals the illogic of allowing
Feres principles to guide a Bivens action. In Carlson the Supreme Court care-
fully cited four differences between a Bivens remedy and an FTCA remedy:
(1) the Bivens remedy is a stronger deterrent because the defendants are individ-
uals rather than the federal government;" (2) a Bivens suit allows punitive dam-
ages; (3) a plaintiff can opt for a jury trial in a Bivens action; and (4) a Bivens
claim is available despite the unavailability of an identical claim under state
law.14 The Carlson opinion indicated that "the Bivens remedy is more effective
than the FTCA remedy."' 14 1 Despite these clear distinctions between Bivens and
FTCA claims, the Stanley Court later found that servicemen are precluded from
bringing either claim when their injuries arise out of or are in the course of
activity incident to service. 142 It was inconsistent for the Supreme Court to des-
ignate the Bivens action as the superior protection of constitutional rights, but
later subject the Bivens action to the same exceptions which bind the FTCA
135. Id. at 3074 and nn. 25-26 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 3075 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For examples of situations in which the judiciary is
already involved in military matters, see Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3075 n.27 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 3075 (Brennan, 3., dissenting). See also Schwartz, Making Intramilitary Tort Law
More Civil: A Proposed Reform of the Feres Doctrine, 95 YALE L. J. 992 (1986). Examining the
effects of a damages remedy on military decisionmaking, Schwartz suggests that different levels of
protection should be afforded military officers depending on the type of activity involved: "a strate-
gic or tactical decision during wartime may be entitled to the utmost protection from judicial intru-
sion, whereas a decision to test the usefulness of LSD ... deserves less protection." Id. at 1005-06
(citation omitted). Schwartz recommended particularized inquiry into each military activity to de-
termine whether protection of decisionmaking during that activity is justified. Id. at 1006. Contra
Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1236 (3d Cir. 1981), cert denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982) (if a
battlefield and non-battlefield distinction prevailed, soldiers could bring suits for injuries occurring
during basic training or wartime maneuvers; such suits would undermine officer decisionmaking).
138. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3076 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("If those concerns are not implicated
by a soldier's constitutional claim, Feres should not thoughtlessly be imposed to prevent redress of
an intentional constitutional violation."); see also Gaspard v. United States, 713 F.2d 1097, 1102-03
(5th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 469 U.S. 975 (1985) (Although Feres doctrine barred the Bivens claim in
this particular situation, "the Feres bar ... does not automatically preclude the Bivens claim.");
Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344, 355 (1979) (when part of soldier's complaint alleged
that federal officials had administered LSD to him, plaintiff's Bivens claim was found to state a valid
cause of action despite the dismissal of separate FTCA claims).
Brennan appeared to recommend moving away from an "incident to service" test in favor of
precluding the claim only to prevent disruption of the officer-subordinate relationship. He stated,
"[u]nless the command relationship.., is involved, these violations should receive moral condemna-
tion and legal redress without limitation to that accorded negligent acts." Id. at 3075 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
139. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
140. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 21-23; see supra text accompanying notes 63-75.
141. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 20.
142. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3060-63; Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
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action. 143
In short, the Stanley decision is an unnecessary and illogical extension of
precedent. Though "special factors" should preclude a Bivens claim by military
personnel under certain circumstances, Stanley extended the concept of military
discipline beyond the officer-subordinate setting to a loyalty concept of military
discipline without a concrete justification or a practical effect. In order to pro-
tect this broader concept of discipline, the Supreme Court borrowed the "inci-
dent to service" test from Feres. By relying on Feres principles, the Court failed
to appreciate the clear distinctions between constitutional violations and
negligence.
The second major analytical issue is whether the Stanley decision harmo-
nizes with principles of governmental immunity. 144 An overriding principle in
the law of immunity is that all citizens, including federal officials, are subject to
federal law. 145 Butz v. Economou 146 established that "qualified immunity from
damages liability should be the general rule for executive officials charged with
constitutional violations," 147 and that "federal officials who seek absolute ex-
emption from personal liability for unconstitutional conduct must bear the bur-
den of showing that public policy requires an exemption." 148 Although this
general rule of qualified immunity is subject to exceptional circumstances con-
ferring absolute immunity, 149 situations involving national security are not per
se considered exceptional circumstances. In Mitchell v. Forsyth 150 the Supreme
Court held that "[t]he danger that high federal officials will disregard constitu-
tional rights in their zeal to protect the national security is sufficiently real to
counsel against affording such officials an absolute immunity."15 ' In Scheurer v.
Rhodes 152 officers in the executive branch of a state government were provided
qualified immunity only, even though their actions involved direct military or-
143. But see Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1234 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
972 (1982):
The first distinction between this case and Feres-the fact that here suit was brought
against government officials rather than against the government-provides a stronger argu-
ment for not allowing suit than in Feres. Suits against individuals have a far greater poten-
tial for chilling responsible decision-making than those against the government.
Id.
144. Justice Brennan devoted the second portion of his dissenting opinion to criticizing the ma-
jority decision as a grant of absolute immunity. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3068-73 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Scalia, delivering the opinion for the majority, reserved the final section of his opinion
for a response to Brennan's criticism. Id. at 3064-65. The result is a complicated Brennan-Scalia
debate about whether the holding in Stanley contradicts principles of immunity.
145. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978).
146. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
147. Id. at 508.
148. Id. at 506; see also Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3038 (1987) (government
officials receive qualified immunity; liability depends on the objective legal reasonableness of their
actions); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982) ("cases make plain that qualified immunity
represents the norm").
149. Butz, 438 U.S. at 507.
150. 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
151. Id. at 523.
152. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
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ders.153 Thus, under the present state of the law, "qualified, rather than abso-
lute, immunity is the norm for government officials, even in cases involving
military matters." 154 Federal officials seeking any greater protection bear the
burden of proving that absolute immunity is essential. 155
The question becomes whether completely precluding a serviceman's Bivens
action because of "special factors" is equivalent to granting the violating federal
officials absolute immunity, thereby departing from the common law rule of
qualified immunity.156 In a sense, the Stanley decision is consistent with the
principles of qualified immunity. The existence of a cause of action, after all, is a
completely separate issue from the degree of immunity for certain defendants.1
57
In Stanley the Supreme Court can be seen as merely deciding whether a Bivens
cause of action exists.158 In the process, the Court determined whether any "spe-
cial factors" were strong enough to preclude the cause of action. Thus, the
Court refused to define the Bivens action solely in terms of immunity principles;
the Court rejected an analysis under which it would be forced to provide a Biv-
ens action simply because prohibiting such an action would give certain parties
absolute immunity. 159 Instead, the Supreme Court consistently followed the ap-
proach mandated by Chappell: assutne the availability of a Bivens claim, but
preclude such a claim if "special factors" counsel hesitation. 160 Immunity for
particular defendants should not even be considered until after the cause of ac-
tion has first been recognized and defined. 16
1
On the other hand, the Supreme Court recognized the Bivens action seven-
teen years ago.16 2 The Stanley decision essentially is concerned not with defining
the existence of a Bivens claim, but with defining an exception to the Bivens
claim. From this perspective, preventing potential plaintiffs from bringing the
claim because of "special factors" is identical to providing potential defendants
with absolute immunity. 163 Both inquiries involve an exception to the usual
153. Id. at 247.
154. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3072 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see generally Jaffee v. United States,
663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981) (Gibbons, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982). Jaffee, a
soldier in the United States Army, was ordered to stand in a field as a nuclear device was exploded a
short distance away. Id. at 1229. The majority refused to allow a Bivens action. Id. at 1239-40. In
dissent, Gibbons noted, "the generally applicable federal law of official immunity announced in Butz
v. Economou would not provide absolute immunity for these defendants." Id. at 1255 (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting).
155. Butz, 438 U.S. at 506.
156. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3069-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 3064. "The availability of a damages action under the Constitution for particular
injuries (those incurred in the course of military service) is a question logically distinct from immu-
nity to such an action on the part of particular defendants." Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. Scalia maintained that the "special factors" limitation was an analytical step above and
beyond immunity. In attacking Brennan's position, Scalia stated, "the rule the dissent proposes is
not an application but a repudiation of the 'special factors' limitation upon the inference of Bivens
actions. That limitation is quite hollow if it does nothing but duplicate pre-existing immunity from
suit." Id. at 3064-65.
161. Id.
162. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.
163. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3069 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Cross v. Fiscus, 830 F.2d 755,
756 (7th Cir. 1987)(military personnel need not worry about qualified and absolute immunities when
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availability of a Bivens action. As Brennan stated in his dissent:
[There is no] dispute that the question whether a Bivens action exists is
"analytically distinct from the question of official immunity from Biv-
ens liability"... [the dissent contends] only that the "special factors"
analysis of Bivens and the functional analysis of immunity are based on
identical judicial concerns. 164
Thus, with the Bivens action already recognized and firmly entrenched under
various circumstances, 165 Stanley is clearly a case in which the Supreme Court
considers whether to find an exception.
By deciding that "special factors" warrant an exception to the Bivens action
when military personnel bring a claim against federal officials, the Supreme
Court necessarily has granted certain officers absolute immunity from money
damages. Yet, the Court provided absolute immunity without demanding the
requisite showing that public policy requires such immunity. 166 Total immunity
from damages liability diminishes the value of the Bivens action and seriously
endangers the constitutional rights which a Bivens remedy was designed to pro-
tect. 167 The Stanley decision is therefore inconsistent with Butz v. Economou, 168
in which the Court was careful to avoid such a result. 169 The majority should
have realized that the holding in Stanley was inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's established principle of qualified immunity.
Questions about whether Stanley logically followed precedent, 170 and
whether Stanley improperly granted absolute immunity17 1 raise complex legal
issues which are far removed from the reality that James Stanley was given large
doses of LSD without his consent or his knowledge. He suffered psychological
disturbances adversely affecting his marriage and his military career. 172 An ac-
tion to enjoin the Army's conduct was, of course, out of the question. t73 His
alternative, a money damages remedy, was barred by the Supreme Court be-
cause his injuries resulted from Army drug testing, an activity considered inci-
sued by other members of the military because Bivens doctrine does not apply to injuries in the
course of military service).
164. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3069 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
165. See, eg., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (against federal prison officials); Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (against a former congressman); Butz, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (against
Department of Agriculture employees); Bivens, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (against narcotics agents); see
supra text accompanying notes 40-75.
166. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3072 (Brennan, 3., dissenting) ("The case should be remanded and
respondents required to demonstrate that absolute immunity was necessary to the effective perform-
ance of their functions.").
167. Id.
168. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
169. Butz, 438 U.S. at 505 ("The extension of absolute immunity from damages liability to all
federal executive officials would seriously erode the protection provided by basic constitutional
guarantees.").
170. See supra text accompanying notes 110-43.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 144-69.
172. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3057.
173. The Stanley decision did not deny servicemen an action "to halt or prevent the constitu-
tional violation." Id. at 3063. Still, Stanley could not enjoin conduct which took place nearly thirty
years ago. Even in 1958, he could not have enjoined the action because he was unaware that the
Army was using him for drug experimentation. Id. at 3057.
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dent to his military service. When isolated in terms of James Stanley's
individual story, the holding seems unjust. The third major issue therefore con-
cerns the extent to which the courts will subordinate human rights in order to
avoid the breakdown of military discipline.
Assuming that the Court correctly precluded Stanley's Bivens action be-
cause his injuries arose during activity "incident to service," the paramount
question becomes whether drug testing should be considered an activity incident
to military life. The majority paid remarkably little attention to this issue. Stan-
ley argued that there was no evidence that his injury was incident to service,1 74
but the Court quickly disposed of his argument because the issue had been de-
cided against Stanley by the court of appeals. 175 Apparently, both the Supreme
Court and the court of appeals gave relatively little consideration to two impor-
tant factors: first, that Stanley neither consented to nor had knowledge of the
LSD testing, 176 and second, that the Army may have been out of its realm in
conducting drug experiments on human beings.
Justices O'Connor and Brennan clearly contemplated this idea. In her dis-
sent, O'Connor agreed with the majority's analysis, accepting the idea that a
Bivens action is unavailable when the injuries arise out of or are in the course of
activity incident to service.177 It was O'Connor's view, however, that "conduct
of the type alleged in this case is so far beyond the bounds of human decency
that as a matter of law it simply cannot be considered a part of the military
mission." 178 Justice Brennan maintained that soldiers subjected to the LSD tests
were treated "as though they were laboratory animals." 17 9 Thus, drug testing on
human beings by the United States Army, especially without the soldier's con-
sent and without adequate disclosure, could certainly be considered activity be-
yond the reasonable limits of military service as a matter of law. Instead of
simply deferring to the factual findings of the court of appeals, the Supreme
Court should have explored this possibility, giving full consideration to the high
value of military personnel and the impropriety of encouraging the Army to
engage in human experimentation. The Court's failure at least to consider this
issue constitutes a major gap in the opinion.
The Court's opinion also indicates an insufficient consideration of the pub-
lic policy consequences of the holding. As previously discussed, the Supreme
Court protected a vague concept of loyalty to the military. The decision went
beyond the officer-subordinate relationship with little practical effect. Yet, the
174. Id. at 3061.
175. The court of appeals considered various factors in concluding that Stanley's injuries arose
during an activity incident to service. Stanley v. Central Intelligence Agency, 639 F.2d 1146, 1152
(5th Cir. 1981). The court considered the fact that Stanley was in the Army; that the experiment
was conducted on an Army base and for the Army's benefit; and that he received military pay and
was promised a letter of commendation. Id. The court of appeals rejected the argument that drug
testing could never be a lawful part of military service, relying on Lerner v. United States, No. 76
Civ. 4349 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 1978), aff'd merL, 578 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1978), and Loeh v. United
States, No. 77-2065-B and 77-2023-B (S.D. Ill. April 23, 1979).
176. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3057.
177. Id. at 3065 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
178. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
179. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3066 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Stanley decision will not only fail to advance military discipline, but it poten-
tially could harm it. If, as Brennan feared, government officials are now "free to
violate the constitutional rights of soldiers without fear of money damages,"180
respect for the constitutional rights of enlisted personnel could diminish. Col-
lective morale could decline as servicemen watch violations against their com-
rades go without redress, and the overall result of Stanley could be to erode the
mutual respect between officers and enlisted personnel which is vital to an effi-
cient military system. 18 1 In addition, the possibility of suffering dreadful viola-
tions of constitutional rights will do little to encourage recruits to join the
nation's armed services. In targeting military discipline as a policy objective, the
Court should have paid greater attention to the signals which United States v.
Stanley ultimately would send to existing and potential military personnel.
United States v. Stanley leaves military personnel without a damages rem-
edy against federal officials who violate constitutional rights, as long as the re-
sulting injuries occur during an activity which is incident to military duty. 18 2
While military personnel can still enjoin unconstitutional conduct,183 this relief
is inadequate because servicemen would have to either anticipate violations or be
subject to continuing violations. Neither possibility is likely. 184 In its zeal for
military discipline, the Supreme Court has tangled its priorities. Not only has
the Court placed military discipline and military autonomy above constitutional
rights, but it has overinflated military discipline into a concept which is impli-
cated any time injuries are service-related. This approach places very few limits
on conduct and would seem to tolerate even a malicious violation of constitu-
tional rights.185
180. Id. at 3067 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
181. See United States v. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. 2063, 2074 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("the
morale of Lieutenant Commander Johnson's comrades-in-arms will not likely be boosted by news
that his widow and children will receive only a fraction of the amount they might have recovered").
It is interesting to note that Justice Scalia dissented in Johnson but authored the majority opin-
ion in Stanley. Scalia explained this apparent inconsistency by discussing judicial intrusion into
military concerns. By passing the FTCA, Congress gave the judiciary the authority to become in-
volved in military matters. On the other hand, the United States Constitution is the source of the
Bivens action. The Constitution gives Congress, not the judiciary, the authority "to make Rules for
the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. Thus,
in the Bivens context, the Supreme Court derives its power from inference rather than from statute.
Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3062.
Scalia therefore reasoned that the Court is more appropriately involved in FTCA actions than
in Bivens actions. As a result, a military exception to the Bivens action is more important than a
military exception to an FTCA action. Thus, Justice Scalia dissented in Johnson because the FTCA
authorized judicial involvement; Scalia authored the majority opinion in Stanley because he consid-
ered judicial restraint appropriate in the Bivens context. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3062 & n.5.
182. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3063.
183. Id. The Court emphasized that it was not barring military personnel from all redress, par-
ticularly not "redress designed to halt or prevent the constitutional violation." Id.
184. If the military ever reached a state of affairs in which violations of constitutional rights
became continuous, a damages remedy would become even more necessary.
185. See Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3076 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Brennan could not "comprehend a
policy judgment that frees all federal officials from any doubt that they may intentionally and in bad
faith violate the constitutional rights of those serving in the Armed Forces.").
As an illustration of the absurd results which the "incident to service" test can potentially
produce, see James v. United States, 358 F. Supp. 1381 (D.R.I.), vacated, 502 F.2d 1159 (1st Cir.
1973). James, a member of the United States Navy, was arrested by base security for disorderly
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The nation's military personnel deserve better treatment from the judiciary.
As Justice Brennan conscientiously stated, "[S]oldiers ought not be asked to de-
fend a Constitution indifferent to their essential human dignity."' 186 Legally, the
Supreme Court was faced with the possibility of extending a very narrow excep-
tion to the Bivens action. Factually, the Court was faced with inexcusable disre-
spect for the bodily integrity, human dignity, and the constitutional rights of an
American soldier. The Supreme Court deprived James Stanley of his cause of
action out of concern for loyalty to the armed services, but the Court failed to
explain the connection between submitting to LSD tests and loyalty to one's
country. The result is not only disappointing, but legally and morally questiona-
ble as well.
KEVIN QUIRK
conduct and was taken into custody. While in a guard house awaiting a sobriety test, James was
fatally beaten by a military security guard during an argument. Id. at 1382. The district court held
"James' injuries arose out of or were in the course of activity incident to service and that recovery
against the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act [was] barred." Id. at 1385. Even though
the decision involved an FTCA claim and even though it was eventually vacated and remanded, the
case is a good illustration of how the courts may tend to interpret the "incident to seryice" test too
broadly.
186. Id. at 3077 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1262
(3d Cir. 1981) (Gibbons, J., dissenting), cert denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982):
A decision which eliminates an important means of access to the courts-a means which in
some cases may be the last resort in face of efforts at concealment-is a major assault upon
an important citadel of Amercian democracy: military accountability to civil government.
The decision embodies a public policy that is affirmatively evil. Rather than a "special
factor counselling hesitation," the military status of the victims and perpetrators is a spe-
cial factor calling for vigilance.
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